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To alleviate financial crises, many developing allocation. Incentives to providers are important
countries ate considering health insurance as an because they determine the supply of services
option for increasing available resources in the and can also tremendously affect demand.
health sector. But besides affecting revenues,
insurance also affects how efficiently and As examples from Brazil, China, and Korea
equitably health services are delivered. show, providers can increase the use of curative
services so much that health care costs escalate
To undersLand how insurance affecLs the rapidly, resource allocation in the sector is
delivery of health services, Kutzin and Barnum distorted, medical technologies are inappropri-
studied systems in Brazil, China, Korea, aiid ately used, and access to services is inequitable.
Zaire. They looked at the following characteris- To correct these distortions, a publ.c insurance
tics of insurance programs: the system for institution should create incentives that encour-
reimbursing providers, the services covered, the age providers to behave in a manner consistent
insurer's role, the extent to which beneficiaries with social goals. This is achieved most easily
help cover costs, and the proportion of the with direct insurance, where the goals of the
population covered by insurance. insurer and the provider are identical, but third-
party payers can also take an active role.
Kutzin and Bamum use the following
indicators for efficiency and equity in the Problems promoting efficient and equitable
delivery of health services: cost escalation, delivery of health services are magnified when
resource allocation, the use of specific medical an insurer serves merely as a financial conduit
technologies, and equity of access to services. for reimbursing providers. Goals of efficiency
and equity can be more effectively promoted by
They conclude that insurers must take an an insurance institution that actively organizes
active role in establishing institutional mecha- consumers' entry into the health system and
nisms (such as contractual obligations) that removes the financial incentives that encourage
encourage health service providers to make providers to increase the volume and cost of
efficient and equitable decisions about resource services.
ThePolicy Research Working PaperSeriesdisseminates the findingsofwork under way in the Bank. Anobjectiveofthc series
is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully polishcd. The findings, interpretations, and
conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official Rank policy.
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HOW HEALTH INSURANCE AFFECTS THE
DELIVERY OF HEALTH CARE IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES*
INTRODUCTION
Financial crisis is a common state of affairs in the government health sector of many
developing countries, and an increasing number are considering implementing user charges and
insurance programs to shift some of the financial burden for health services away from direct budget
allocations by a health ministry. Although they are often implemented as ways of mobilizing
additional resources, prices and insurance also affect the allocation of health resources by changing
the signals sent to producers and consumers of health services. Changes in incentives engendered
by these alternative financing programs, therefore, have implications for the efficiency and equity of
health services delivery, in addition to their more obvious impact on revenues. This paper examines
institutional aspects of insurance programs in four developing countries--Brazil, China, Korea, and
Zaire--and assesses the impact of each on the efficiency and equity of the health sector. Much
attention is given to insurance reimbursement of hospitals because these represent the largest
component of national health expenditures and are the focal point for much of the activity in the
sector. The case study countries were selected because their hospitals are financed largely, and in
some cases entirely, by sources other than government budget allocations and because excellent
descriptions of their health financing systems exist. Understanding how alternative financing
programs have distorted the allocation of health resources and how these distortions might be
mitigated is important for these countries and others considering changes to their present system of
health care financing.
Different forms and combinations of user fees and insurance are associated with different
incentives to consumers and providers of health services. These incentives can beneficially or
perversely affect the performance of both hospitals and the health sector more generally. For each
country case study, the characteristics of the insurance program(s) are described along a number of
dimensions, including: 1) reimbursement system; 2) services covered by insurance 3) insurer role;
4) extent of consumer cost-sharing; and 5) extent of population coverage. These features are
discussed in more detail in the next section of the paper, and Table 1 summarizes them for each of
the case study insurance programs.
The incentives created by these specific characteristics affect the performance of the health
sector. "Performance" can be interpreted many ways, so we propose several ootential efficiency and
equity effects which can be compared across programs. These include: 1) cost escalation; 2) the
allocation of sectoral resources between secondary/tertiary and primary care, and the effectiveness
of referral; 3) the use of specific medical technologies; and 4) equity of access to health services.
Where sufficient information is available, we assess the impacts of insurance programs on each of
these dimensions of performance. A discussion of lessons learned concludes each country case study.
' The authors wish to thank Bill McGreevey for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
2Table 1. Characteristics of Health Insurance Systems
Country/ Reimburse- | Covered Insurer Cost Sharing Populatioi1
Program ment System Services Role Coverage
Brazil before Retrospective Curative Passive None Near
1983 fee-for-service universal
Brazil after Retrospective Curative; Gatekeeper None Same as
1983 case-based possibility for requirement above; SUDS
preventive should plans move to
with SUDS reduce universal
______________ passivity access
China Retrospective Predominantly Passive Not for most 20-30% of
fee-for-service curative of the insured population
Korea Retrospective Most curative Largely Substantial Universal
fee-for-service services; some passive official cost-
high-tech sharing; plus
excluded unofficial
payments
Zaire's Direct prepaid Hospital care Active; 20% for most 60% of rural
Bwamanda w/elements of if beneficiary access to services; none population
Health Plan retrospective has been hospital is for delivering voluntarily
case-based referred effectively mothers who enrolled
monitored obtained
prenatal care
The analysis is limited to the extent that insufficient data exist to quantify the impact of a
health insurance program on any of these dimensions of performance. However, where observed
changes are consistent with the incentives in place, we infer causality as to the direction (and in some
cases, the magnitude) of changes in these indicators. Table 2 summarizes the observed or expected
effects of the case study insurance programs on the four indicators of health sector efficiency and
equity.
OVERVIEW OF INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
The reimbursement system refers to the manner by which providers are paid out of an
insurance fund. We classify the reimbursement systems of insurance schemes into two major types:
third party retrospective reimbursement and prepaid capitation health care organizations. Third party
retrospective plans involve remuneration of the provider by a separate insurance fund after services
have been delivered, whereas prepaid capitation organizations either serve as both insurer and
provider (direct insurance) or pay a separate provider (third party arrangement) a fixed amount out
Table 2. Observed or Expected Effects of Health Insurance Programs
|Country/ Cost Resource Allocation Choic,. of Access and E, uityE Program Escalation Technology
Brazil before Very high Skewed toward Provider induced Very high payments
1983 privately provided use of profitable f.r relatively few
curative care high-tech services patients; supply
and drugs skewed toward
l__________ lwealthy urban areas
Brazil after Probably Case mix shift with Incentives for No noticeable change
1983 still high, AIH; SUDS should particular with AIH; SUDS
but few yield better mix of technologies should provide
data curative and remain, but to L universal access, but
preventive lesser extent supply constraint
likely to remain in
rural areas
China Very high Skewed toward Powerful financial Consumption of
curative care in incentives to services heavily
higher level provide new high- skewed toward the
facilities tech services and insured
____________ drugs
Korea High Consumers chose Unregulated high- Poor insured at
high-tech hospitals tech services disadvantage due to
despite higher cost pushed as a means high copayments and
sharing; legal of competing for unofficial payments to
change requiring patients providers
referral should help l
Zaire's Goal of Referral No available Strong evidence of
Bwamanda increasing requirements information moral hazard and
Health Plan hospital effectively adverse selection;
resources encouraging possibly access
being met consumers to first problems for the
use health centers uninsured
of which the provider will serve the health needs of the program's enrollees for a specified period.
Retrospective reimbursement plans typically use prospectively determined prices in the form of fee
schedules that indicate the units of service which are reimbursable under the program. The most
common forms of retrospective reimbursement are fee-for-service payment systems, which involve
charging for each individual service consumed by a patient, such as inpatient bed-days, drugs, and
x-rays. An alternative to this for hospital inpatient care is case-based reimbursement. With this
method, there is one global charge based on the category of patient admission (for example, lung
cancer admissions, maternity admissions, etc.) irrespective of the type and quantity of specific
services provided during the patient stay. The most well-known example of case-based
reimbursement is the Medicare hospiial payment system in the United States. where admissions are
4grouped into categories, called Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs), based on their clinical
characteristics. However, as is shown below, there are examples of case-bused reimbursement in
developing countries as well.
Insurance programs vary as to the covered services that are reimbursable. Different incentives
are likely to be generated if the program covers only curative services rather than both curative and
preventive care. Another important aspect of this feature is whether specific curaiive services are
excluded from coverage, or if there are administrative procedures that must be followed (referral
requirements, for example) for services to be reimbursed under a program. This characteristic can
have implications for resource allocation, technology choice, and the effectiveness of a referral
system.
An important feature of insurance programs is whether the insuring institution plays an active
or passive role with regard to the providers of care. Is the insuring institution merely a fir.ancial
cornduit, or does it attempt to enforce cost discipline on providers? A useful way of analyzing this
issue is to assess the extent to which the insurer and the provider have common interests. On a
purely financial level, we might assume that the insurer wants to minimize payments to providers,
whereas providers want to maximize payments from the insurer's revenues. With direct insurance,
the provider and insurer are the same institution, so this system lends itself to a very active insurer
role. However, third party arrangements can involve a whole spectrum of roles, from laissez-faire
to active monitoring and review of provider activities by the insurer.
Cost-sharing refers to the amount that health insurance beneficiaries (consumers) have to pay
each time they use serv'rvs. Forms of cost-sharing include deductibles (a set amount which the
beneficiary must pay before rec' iing insurance benefits) and copayments (the amount of the charges
for specific services which insurance does not pay, excluding the deductible). Economists often
recommend that cost-sharing be included in insurance programs to discourage overuse of services by
insured persons, who would otherwise face a zero price at the point of service. Insurance creates an
incentive for behavioral change on the part of the insured, who are protected from severe financial
loss and are thus likely to demand more services than the uninsured. This additional demand is called
moral hazard and is conceptually similar to what is often termed "unnecessary utilization" arising in
free care systems. Cost-sharing is intended to limit the effects of moral hazard.
The extent of population coverage is the final characteristic of insurance programs to be
considered in this paper. As with the other characteristics, this can exhibit a wide range, from
universal coverage to only a small percentage of the population with coverage. An important feature
to consider is whether insurance is voluntary or is mandated by law for specific groups of the
population. Where coverage is voluntary, the viability of insurance can be threatened by adverse
selection, the tendency for persons likely to consume a higher than average quantity of services to
purchase insurance. Where coverage is mandated for specific groups of the population, equity
problems may arise because the uninsured face much higher prices than the insured. This equity
issue is also a concern in voluntary systems where some people may not be able to afford to purchase
insurance and may thus have limited financial access to services as a result.
COUNTRY CASES
Brazil Prior to 1983
Most curative personal health care in Brazil was financed by the National Institute for Medical
Care and Social Security (INAMPS), the health insurance component of Brazil's payroll-financed
social security system. Preventive care and basic curative services for the poor were provided by the
Ministry of Health, which was financed through government budget allocations and administered
separately from INAMPS. The social security system has grown rapidly, from coverage of 23
percent of the population in 1963 to over 90 percent in 1982 (McGreevey, 1982). Although
insurance coverage has become nearly universal, there is great disparity in the supply of health
providers between the relatively well off south and southeastern ivgons of Brazil and the rest of the
country (Briscoe, 1990). Until 1983, INAMPS reimbursed physicians and hospitals on a fee-for-
service basis for each service provided to patients according to an official price list which included
2,600 items (the Hospital Guide (GIH) system). INAMPS paid all costs; covered persons were not
responsible for any cost sharing. Under this system, INAMPS served largely as a third party payer
for services ilelivered by private providers. In 1981 for example, 85 percent of hospitalizations paid
for by INAMPS were in private contract hospitals, while only about 9 percent (including 2 percent
in INAMPS' own facilities) were in public sector facilities (McGreevey, 1988). Thus, INAMPS
under the GIH system could be characterized as a retrospective fee-for-service reimbursement system
covering curative services only. INAMPS served a3 a passive financial conduit; it did not try to
impose cost consciousness on providers, and the absence of cost sharing meant that consumers also
had nothing to gain by limit-ag their utilization of services. The implications of these characteristics
are described below.
Cost escalation. Largely as a res"lt of the incentives of the curative care reimbursement
system, health expenditures increased by more than 20 percent annually during the 1970s, and public
sector health expenditure as a share of GDP rose from I perzent in 1949 to 3.7 percent in 1975 and
5.6 percent in 1982 (World Bank data). From the late 1960s until the early 1980s, the number of
private hospital beds increased by over 40 percent, and the hospital industry grew faster than the rest
of the economy (Rodrigues, 1989). The fee-for-service reimbursement system encouraged hospitals
to increase both the number of patients and the amount of services provided per patient as a means
of generating profits. The private provider network "responded to a set of incentives that paid
[providers] whatever they billed to provide virtually unlimited services to patients who bore none of
the costs directly" (Briscoe, 1990). The retrospective fee-for-service system coupled with the passive
role played by INAMPS with respect to monitoring private providers was probably responsible for
the widespread fraud (e.g., billing for non-existent patients and procedures by the private health
provider network) discovered in the mid-1980s.
Resource allocation. The curative health subsystem, financed through payroll taxes,
developed independently from the Ministry of Health's public health programs, and grew with
increased employment and economic expansion in the 1960s and 1970s. The MOH budget's share
of GDP declined over this period. Thus, the explosive growth of total health care spending referred
to above occurred entirely in the market for curative services. The result of these forces was that
the share of government (MOH plus INAMPS) health expenditure devoted to curative (medical and
hospital) as opposed to preventive services rose from 36 percent in 1965 to 85 percent in the early
6
1980s. Hospitals alope accounted for nearly 70 percent of public health expenditures, up from less
than 40 percent in the 1960s (Briscoe, 1990).
M .ical technology incentives. There were no discernible financial or institutional incentives
for private providers financed by INAMPS to limit the provision of certain treatment technologies
which were the most profitable. Indeed, McGreevey (1988) suggests that the 1982 INAMPS fee
schedule payment rate for a physician consultation was quite low relative to the value of a doctor's
time, whereas capitalized medical technology embedded in pharmaceuticals and medical equipment
was priced well above cost. Doctors were thus financially encouraged by the system to overuse
services, drugs, tests, facilities, and operations in order to enhance their incomes. One service
encouraged by the reimbursement system was caesarean deliveries, which in 1981 accounted for 31
percent of all births, giving Brazil the highest rate of any country in the world. Another example is
diagnostic services, particularly x-ray, use of which grew at a very rapid annual rate from 1970 to
1981. Reportedly, many of these tests could have been avoided without detracting from treatment.
In 1979, the Rio de Janeiro State University Hospital reduced the number of x-rays by 40 percent and
found no loss in diagnostic efficiency. These and other types of complementary examinations (the
number of which grew at 22 percent per year between 1979 and 1981) could have been eiiminated
with no effect on the treatment ultimately administered to patients (McGreevey, 1988).
Access and equity. The incentives of the reimbursement system encouraged rapid expansion
in the volume of services provided to individual patients. One result was the allocation of a
substantial share of total public health expenditures toward costly high technology services, such as
renal dialysis, heart bypass operations, and computed tomography (CT) scans, which benefit relatively
few people. The magnitude of this effect was such that in 1981, total expenditure on 12,000 high
cost patients was greater than the amount spent to provide basic health services and disease control
for 41 million people in the poor north and northeast regions of the country (McGreevey, 1988).
Thus, the incentives for using expensive high-technology services clearly led to an inequitable pattern
of expenditures.
Lessons learned. The experience of Brazil's social security financed health insurance system
prior to 1983 sheds light on a number of important issues. Fee-for-service reimbursement of private
providers with no beneficiary cost-sharing by a public agency exercising no control over utilization
led to provider-induced increases in the volume of medical services beyond what was medically
necessary. The use of specific technologies and services with the greatest profit margins grew at
particularly rapid rates. This resulted in rapid growth of expenditures on curative services and
distortions away from a cost effective mix of preventive and curative care. This distortion was
especially pronounced because these services were financed separately (INAMPS financed curative,
the MOH financed preventive); therefore, cross-subsidization of preventive care by the rapidly
growing curative services was not possible.
Brazil After 1983
The Brazilian government implemented a number of reforms to its hospital reimbursement
system during the 1980s in an attempt to control the growth in hospital costs and utilization which
had arisen from the fee-for-service insurance system. A pilot program of financing and administering
health services was implemented in the relatively prosperous state of Parana. This system, called the
Curitiba Plan for the state capital, had two distinguishing features:
71) Initial patient contact with health providers (triage) occurred at an INAMPS or other public
(state or municipal) facility, where walk-in patients would be examined by a physician-
auditor (employed by INAMPS). The physician-auditor either treated the patient or
referred him./her for hIigher level set vices as needed. Walk-in patients were not authorized
to go directly to private facilities.
2) The INAMPS physician-auditor assigned the patient to a service group, and case-based
reimbursement rates were tied to assignment, regardless of the treatment setting (e.g.,
public clinic, private hospital, etc.). Facilities and providers are reimbursed a fixed amount
per case, and only for the procedures specified by the physician-auditor. If a hospital
treated a patient at less cost than the reimbursement amount, it profited. If treatment costs
exceeded the case payment rate, the hospita oore the financial loss.
These features, which were implemented more broadly throughout INAMPS in 1983 as part
of the Hosp;.al Certification System (AIH), were aimed at many of the problems inherent under the
GIH system. Prior *o implementation of the Curitiba Plan, nmany walk-in patients were treated by
private hospitals as emergency cases, whick received substantially higher fee-for-service
reimbursements from INAMPS. The public triage requirement created a structured referral system
to address this. In addition, by separating the decision on the course of treatment from the facility
which would actually provide (and be reimbursed for) the care, the financial incentive to
overprescribe and overuse complementary examinations and services in private facilities was
diminished.' Under the initial Ctiritiba project, hospitalizations were reduced to 5 percent of initial
consultations, compared to a Brazilian average of 6.5 percent. By mid-1982 (the Curitiba pilot began
in 1981), INAMPS declared that the plan had reduced hospital admissions by 30 percent (McGreevey,
1988). Unfortunately, however, we are not aware of any subsequent follow-up studies that would
demonstrate ti- long term effects of these changes.
INAMPS reforms altered some, but not all, of the key characteristics of the health insurance
system. The reimbursement system remained retrospective, but on a case basis rather than fee-for-
service. There were still no cost-sharing provisions for INAMPS beneficiaries. By requiring
entrance to services via public primary care providers (i.e., its own employees), the role of INAMPS
in enforcing cost discipline on private providers became more active.2 Under the AIH system, the
financing and administration of curative and preventive care remained separate, but in 1987 the
Unified and Decentralized Health System (SUDS) was announced with the aim of correcting this
situation. The objective of SUDS was to unify the functions and resources of INAMPS and the MOH
I This would be true to the extent that the INAMPS physician-auditor did not also work in pnvate practice or for a
private hospital, or was immune to influence from private providers. One problem of the system prior to 1983 noted by
McGreevcy (1988) was a conflict of interest arising because most physicians who were employed in public clinics were
also holding positions with at least one private health care provider. Indeed, a 1981 survey of physicians in Greater Sao
Ptulo found that they average 3.5 jobs each. This conflict of interest continues to be an issue fc. he post-1983 INAMPS
physician-auditors, as the reformed system places tremendous resource allocatior. -owers in t.. hands of these public
employees. Private contractors clearly ha-e much to gain by trying to influence the I hysician-auditors' decisions.
2 Other activities undertaken by INAMPS reflective of its more active role vis-a-vis the private provider network
included implementation of more systematic and thorough audits of private contractors, establishment of public reference
centers for high-technology services, and modification of procedures by which high-cost items were procured by private
contractors (Briscoe, 1990).
8at the state and municipal level. In this way, curative and prevartive services would be financed by
the same iistitution. While the incentives inherent in this reform fo, redressing resource allocation
problems are e!ear, Brazil has been slow to implement the plan (Briscoe, 1990), and thus its effects
have not yet been observed.
Cost escalation. There are few empirical data with uhich the impact of INAMPS reforms on
health care cost escalation since 1983 can be ar:alyzed. A study of Brazilian hospitalization during
the 1980s (Rodrigues, 1989) concluded that the change to cas.-based reimbursement did not appear
to be effective in controlling health care costs becduse it created an incenitive for private hospitals to
increase certain types of admissions. In addition, although a system of prospectively set
reimbursement rates encourages providers to economize Ca the level of resources allocated to the care
of an individual patient, such a system also provides incentives for hospitals to maximize the volume
of profitable admissions. Howeve. to date there have been no expenditure data available to sompare
the effects on total hospital costs of the fee-for-service system with the case-based system.'
Resource allocation. The case-based reimbursement system created inceiitives for private
hospitals to adjust their inpatient case rnix. With a limited number of case payment groups, there will
be patients of varying severity within each category. INAMPS reportedly set payment rates based
on average reimbursement within a category (Rodrigues, 1989). One way that hospital, could
minimize their resource inputs per case would be to treat the less severe patients within a category
and try to shifL sicker patients to public hospitals. Rodrigues concluded that private hospitals did,
in fact, shift more costly patients to public and university hospitals, leaving themselves with a less
severe case mix for which profit margins per patient were greater. Supporting evidence is provided
by Briscoe (1990), who examined inpatient mortality data and concluded that patients in public
hospitals had significantly more severe conditions, on average, thai. those in private hospitals.
In terms of resource allocation between cuiative aid preventive caru, the trend towards a
decreasing preventive share apparently reversed itself, as 78 percent of health expenditures were
devoted to curative care in 1986, down from 85 percent in 1982 (World Bank data). This change
occurred before the SUDS was announced, and although this approach would seem to allow for a
reallocation of health resources toward a more cost effective mix of preventive and curative care
services, there are as yet no data upon which an evaluation of this reform can be made.
Medical technology incentives. There is little information available on the utilization of
specific medical technologies since 1983. The case-based payment system should have diminished
the overuse of complementary diagnostic tests and other services which was prevalent under the
earlier system. In addition, some controls over the use of high-technology services were instituted.
Nevertheless, Briscoe (1990) reports that INAMPS paid over three percent of its total budget in 1988
on just four outpatient treatment procedures (hemodialysis, hemodynamic studies, endoscopy, and
computerized tomography). Thus, further controls or limitations of INAMPS financing of high-
technology services may be needed.
The World Bank's LA I PH division is proposing to analyze newly accessible data on costs and utilization in private
hospitals in Brazil covering the period 1981-1990. Hopefully, this will yield conclusions as to the effects of the change
in reimbursement systems on cost escalation.
9Lessons learned. Brazil's attempts to address the deficiencies of its pre-1983 health financing
system appear to generate better incentives tor a more efficient health care delivery system, but there
are insufficient data available to clearly evaluate the impact of various reforms (though this may be
remedied by the proposed study mentioned in the previous footnote). The Curitiba Pian and later the
AIHi created an institutional framework for moving consumers through the health care systeni in an
organized manner and for limiting provider-induced demand by requiring that the gatekeepers to the
system be employees of the insurt r, and that these employees determine the total course of treatmrent
to be provided. Pixed reimiburse..i,nt on a case basis rather than fee-for-service should reducc the
number of unnecessary procedures that are perfornied. Finally, unifying the resou,ces and
administration of the institutions responsible for delivering both curative and preventive services
should allow for cross-subsidization and the possibility of a more cost effective health care delivery
system.
China4
In 1981, China's health facilities were instructed to cover their non-staff recurrent costs
through user charges, paid either out-of-pocket or through insurance. Although facilities are all
publicly owned, this change induced them to operate in a manner similar to private institutions. By
1988, 82 percent of recurrent health expenditures were estimated to have been made through a
combination of patient fee payments and insurance reimbursement. In that year, about 20 percent
of the population was covered under government and employer-sponsored (though heavily subsidized
tl,rough the tax system) health insurance that reimbursed health providers 100 percent of billed
charges. Another IO to 15 percent of the population is estimated to have more limited coverage (i.e.,
with cost-sharing provisionF). Reimbursement under these programs is on a retrospective fee-for-
service basis, and insurers are third-party payers separate from providers and playing no role other
than financing services. Insurance primarily pays for curative services, but disease prevention
activities for which prices are charged are covered as well.
The pricing of health services has create,i incentives for providers to favor the acquisition and
use of particular types of services and technologies. Fees for technologies and services which were
in use in the late 1950s (e g., outpatient consultations, inpatient care, surgical operations) were set
below costs (without an accurate idea of what cests were) at that time, and even with attempts to
increase prices for this category of services in 1985, fees for most of these "older" medical
techno'ogies, procedures, and services remain considerably below cost. Older price guidelines do
not exist for new technologies, and a number of these (e.g., CT scans, laborato±'y services,
ultrasound, coronary care, ar' dialysis) appear to be priced above costs. Therefore, hospitals benefit
financially when these newer services are consumed. Another category of prices is for drugs.
Hospitals are explicitly allowed to mark up the price of drugs by 10-18 percent over the wholesale
price for which they acquire them. The mark-up foe traditional medicine drugs averages 20 percent.
While the mark-up is intended to cover storage and distribution costs, there are clear incentives to
overprescribe.
Cost escalation. Total health expenditures grew at an annual average rate of 17 percent in real
terms frorn 1980 to 1988, increasing from 2.( percent to 3.2 percent of GDP during these years.
Most of this growth has resulted from increases in patient fee payments (average annual growth rate
4 A forthcoming World Bank study (Bumgarner, ed.) is the source of information provided on China in this section.
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of 23 percent) and insurance reimbursements (15 percent annual growth). Although there are no
available time series utilization data, the need for most health institutions to earn revenues sufficient
to cover operational costs and some capital costs has almost certainly resulted in provider-encouraged
consumption of those health services on which a profit can be earned. The pricing of health (and
particularly hospital) services, coupled with the knowledge that for most of the insured population,
no monetary cost will be borne for these services, has encouraged health care providers to offer more
services, and services with a greater margin betw -en price and marginal cost.
Res- Arce allocation and referral. Another consequence of the incentives of the financial
decentralization reforms in China is that government health expenditures, and to a much greater
extent total health expenditures, have been increasingly devoted to higher level hospitals, while a
decreasing share has been devoted to lower level hospitals. Data on government health expenditures
show that the higher level hospitals' share rose from 38 percent in 1980 to 44 percent in 1987, while
basic hospitals fell from 23 to 17 percent over the same period. Although anti-epidemic and
maternal/child health activities remained around 17 percent of public expenditures, the growth in the
percentage of total health expenditures financed by fees and insurance (from 72 percent in 1980 to
81 percent in 1987), and the preponderance of fee/insurance payments devoted to hospital services
meant that the share of total health expenditures devoted to tasic and preventive services undoubtedly
fell over the period.
The insurance programs do not exercise any influence to steer their beneficiaries to appropriate
levels of the referral network. The lack of effective referral systems has resulted in fee paying (and
especially insured) patients seeking care from higher level facilities when less complex facilities would
have been sufficient. To the extent that future investment decisions are based on (distorted) historical
utilization trends, too great a share of the public investment budget will be devoted to higher level
hospiials. Current distortions, therefore, not only impose short run costs in terms of cost ineffective
utilization but also long run inefficiency via investment decisions based on current patterns of facility
demand.
Medical technology incentives. Hospitals negotiate fees for new technological services with
local health and pric- bureaus, typically on the basis of the likely "average cost" of the service and
assumptions regarding the volume of services likely to be provided. Accordin-g to the World Bank
study, when hospitals are engaged in the price setting negotiations, they have an incentive to project
moderate levels of utilization, but after the price is established, they have a powerful incentive to use
the service intensively to generate financial profits. Case studies of the service costs and prices
charged for specific technologies show there to be strong non-medical incentives to provide several
services, including electroencephalography, coronary care, CT scans, ultrasound, and renal dialysis.
Pricing policy for drugs has led to a defacto subsidy for the domestic pharmaceutical industry
by the health system, and particularly the insurance systems, whicb merely reimburse providers
without any efforts to monitor the cost-effectiveness of utilization patterns. The effects of the
incentives to overprescribe are reflected in an average of 2.3 drugs prescribed per patient visit and
by the nearly 50 percent of total health expenditures going for drugs. This is not just a financial
problem; polypharmacy is clearly contrary to sound medical practice and can have deleterious health
effects.
Access and equity. The combination of high user fees and insurance coverage for only part
of the population has resulted in an inequitat -pattern of health care utilization wherein the provision
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Figure 1. Real Per Capita Recurrent Health Expenditure in China, by Source
of services has been skewed away from the majority of the population. Insurance reimbursements
were the source of 44 percent of health finance in 1988, yet only about 20 percent of the population
was covered under official insurance programs in that year. Figure 1 shows that, on a per capita
basis, consumption of health care by insured persons has been much greater (and is rising) than by
uninsured persons, suggesting some moral hazard on the part of the insured and possibly limited
access for low income uninsured persons. Uninsured people are receiving less health care, and the
rapid growth in fee payments during the 1980s has exacerbated the equity problem because these
persons are using a greater share of their incomes for health services than are the insured.
Lessons learned. As in Brazil under the GIH system, China experienced rapid cost escalation
resulting from third party fee-for-service reimbursement of 100 percent of health service charges.
In a system where only some of the population has insurance coverage, there is clear evidence of
differential utilization of services, suggesting moral hazard on the part of the insured and possibly
limited access for the uninsured. China's experience also highlights the importance of price
incentives for the use of particular medical technologies. The signals sent to providers have resulted
in the expansion of profitable high-technology services and drugs. In addition, because investment
decisions are based on existing signals, the long run consequences of today's distorted price signals
are likely te be an even more inefficient mix of facilities and equipment. In short, although China's
decentralized pricing system and insurance programs have been effective in generating revenues for
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health facilities, thev have done so at the cost of equity in the use of services and inefficiency in their
organization and production.
Republic of Korea'
The first compulsory social security health insurance scheme covering less than 15 percent of
the population was introduced in 1977, and the beneficiary population has been rapidly increased until
universal coverage was achieved in 1989. Insurance is provided through a large number of nonprofit,
noncompeting societies organized at the firm, firm-group, or county level. 'There are programs for
the unemployed and self-employed, plus public assistance programs which essentially pay the
insurance premium for indigent persons (about 10 percent of the population). There are two large
administrative agencies which handle claims processing and payment, data collection, and program
monitoring for all of the insurance societies. They work closely with the Ministry of Health and
occasionally engage in monitoring of claims and utilization review (Yang, 1991).
Services are largely delivered in private facilities, and the insurance agencies and the
government (through the MOH) are somewhat more active than are similar agencies in Brazil and
China vis-a-vis providers. In mid-1989, a law was passed requiring patients to have a referral slip
from clinics before they are allowed to use hospital care, changing the prior situation wherein patients
could choose the provider level at which they entered the health care system. The MOH also defines
the services that are covered by insurance and ultimately determines the prices for covered services.
However, a number of high-technology expensive services, such as CT scanners and Extra-corporeal
Shock Wave Lithotripsy (ESWL) are not covered, and providers can charge unregulated prices for
these (Yang, 1991).
A national schedule of fees is negotiated and then set on a cost-plus basis, and providers are
retrospectively reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis according to this schedule. Un!ike the programs
in Brazil and most health insurance in China, there are significant cost sharing requirements in the
Korean program, except for certain categories of the medically indigent. The combination of third
party benefit payments and cost sharing serves to finance health care, which is largely provided by
private facilities. A combination of deductibles and copayments yield effective coinsurance rates of
62, 65, and 41 percent for outpatient services in general hospitals (highest level), hospitals, and
clinics, respectively. The inpatient coinsurance rate is 20 percent at all facilities. However, extra
payments to senior physicians and other undocumented expenses mean that actual cost sharing rates
are even higher (Yang, 1991).
Cost escalation. Attempts to sort out the effects of the expansion of insurance coverage on
total Korean health expenditures are confounded by the effects of the rapid growth in per capita
income (ahout eight percent annually) that Korea has experienced during the last two decades.
Nevertheless, it is I ikely that the expansion of health insurance played an important role in the growth
of total health spending from 2.8 percent of GNP in 1976 to 4.2 percent in 1985 and an estimated
7.0 percent in 1989 (Yang, 1991). For example, a study (Kim et al., 1986) of one rural province
s A World Bank Technical Paper (De Geyndt, 1991) has recently been published providing insights into cost escalation
and Korea's national health insurance program. The paper assesses alternative strategies for mitigating the rise in health
care expenditures. We were not able to incorporate this paper's findings into our analysis because the technical paper was
not available at the time this section was completed.
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found that insurance coverage effected a 37 percent increase in inpatient admission rates and a 66
percent increase in inpatient days per 100 persons. In addition, the number of visits to outpatient
departments at clinics and hospitals . -eased by 71 percent after the introduction of insurance
coverage.
Yang (1991) found that total expenditure growth resulted from a combination of increases in
cost per case (a nearly threefold increase for inpatient services and a near doubling of outpatient
services from 1980 to 1988, compared to a consumer price index increase of only 60 percent over
the same period) and in the volume of services used (outpatient visits per capita nearly doubled and
hospital admissions per capita rose by about 40 percent). He suggests that one important cause of
the increases in both the average cost and volume of services has been the retrospective fee-for-
service reimbursement system using cost-plus pricing. Under this system, cost-increasing behaviors
are always rewarded, and this is exacerbated over the long run as higher costs induce higher fees.
Despite the presence of significant copayments in the system, hospital utilization data indicate that
there has been a growing tendency to increase the volume of services provided; the frequency of
repeat visits is rising and lengths of hospital stay are increasing. This suggests that incentives on the
demand side (i.e., high copayments) have not been very effective at limiting demand in the face of
rapidly rising incomes.
Resource allocation and referral. There has been no clear distinction among the roles of
clinics, hospitals, and general hospitals because these have all been competing with each other for
patients (Yang, 1991). The insured show a marked tendency to use large general hospitals even for
primary care; these hospitals tend to have higher proportions of specialists and advanced medical
eqtuipment and are accordingly more costly. Using hospitals is also the most expensive option for
a consumer: they are allowed to charge fees which are about 15 percent more expensive than at
clinics, and the perceintage copayment for outpatient care is 50 percent greater. Despite these higher
charges, however, the utilization of general hospitals has risen at almost the same rate as that of
clinics in recent years (Anderson, 1989). The pattern of overuse of the more sophisticated general
hospitals which is becoming established in Korea may give signals that there is a need for more of
these facilities, which could generate still more undesirable cost escalation. The referral requirement
introduced in mid-1989 appears to be an appropriate device for steering patients toward lower level
providers for entry into the health care system, but it is too early to tell how effective this has been
in practice.
Medical technology incentives. Because prices are set by the government, Korean hospitals
cannot compete for patients on the basis of price and must do so on some other basis. By and large,
this other basis has been the availability of senior medical staff and of sophisticated medical
equipment because of the strong societal perception that anything less is not good medical care.
Therefore, it is not surprising that hospitals are acquiring large quantities of modern equipment. One
example is CT scanners, which are now in nearly every hospital with more than 200 beds. The costs
of these devices generally are greater than the revenues collected from their use, but hospitals use
them as loss leaders to attract patients. There are 38 hospitals with approved heart transplant
facilities, and Korea also has 26 ESWLs. That these figures are high is evidenced by a comparison
with Canada, which has 32 heart transplant centers and only four ESWLs (Yang, 1991).
Access and equity. Results from studies undertaken prior to the universalization of health
insurance support the conclusion that insurance coverage leads to moral hazard, and coverage of only
part of the population results in inequitable access to care. Anderson (1989) reports that two years
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after a 1981 demonstration project introduced insurance coverage in three rural provinces, inpatient
service use increased by nearly 75 percent and outpatient use by 80 percent. Comparison of
utilization and charges amongst insured and uninsured inpatients at one university hospital found that
the average volume of services and length of stay for five diagnostic categories were greater for the
insur..d, whereas out-of-pocket charges were greater for the uninsured (Yu, 1983).
Universal coverage under Korea's national health insurance program should theoretically
provide for universal access and better equity implications than had previously existed. However,
as in Brazil, smaller per capita supply of physicians and facilities in rural areas has led to
geographically-based inequity. Another equity concern is the very high coinsurance rates which are
charged in this system. With the exception of some categories of the medically indigent, these
charges are levied irrespective of patient income and thus are more of a burden for poorer families.
Data on per capita health service utilization by income class for insured persons in 1987 shows that
utilization by the poorer insured was considerably less than that of higher income insured persons
(Yang, 1991). In addition, the capacity to make informal "under the table" payments and to pay for
non-covered high-technology services has led to a two-class system of health care. Moreover,
according to Yang, many providers are unwilling to serve public assistance program beneficiaries,
even though they are legally entitled to care. Another source of inequity in this system of universal
coverage derives from the large number of insurance societies. Because each has a relatively small
number of beneficiaries and serves a small geographic area, some serve largely healthy, high-income
persons, and others have to contend with a less healthy risk pool. With no mechanism in place for
premium to be transferred across insurance societies, the higher-risk pools will tend to have higher
payments and fewer resources than lower-risk pools.
Lessons learned. Universal coverage should provide universal access, but the heavy official
cost-sharing obligations which are not income-related (except for the poorest groups) and the
unofficial payments demanded by private providers weigh most heavily on lower-income insured
persons. Despite these significant beneficiary cost sharing requirements in Korea's fee-for-service
reimbursement system, however, the introduction and expansion of insurance has been associated with
rapid growth in health and hospital costs. Demand side approaches to encourage appropriate use of
referral facilities have not been very effective. This suggests that the key to encouraging a more
efficient service delivery system is on the supply side, by providing strong incentives to providers
to limit the volume of services which they provide and to use more cost effective treatment
technologies and settings. Clearly, such incentives are not present in Korea's health insurance
system, with the exception of the recent requirement for patient referral. Although Korea's insurance
program uses its strength as the principle purchaser of services to negotiate a national hospital fee
schedule, an unintended consequence of this has been that private hospitals compete for patients on
the basis of perceived quality. Because consumers' understanding of hospital and medical practice
is usually limited, there may often be great differences between perceived quality and actual quality.
As a result, this competition has taken the form of hospitals accumulating technologically advanced
equipment to attract patients. This has created a distorted pattern of investment which will lead to
an increasingly inefficient mix of services in the future.
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Zaire's Bwamanda Health Zone6
The focus of this case study is only on one small region of Zaire, not a national system of
hospital financing as was the case in the other examples. In many ways, it is not comparable with
the other programs discussed in this paper because it is focused around one district reference hospital
rather than an array of providers that includes sophisticated tertiary hospitals. Nevertheless, several
important lessons can be drawn from the health plan in this region.
In 1975, Zaire developed a plan to organize its health services around a large number of health
zones, each serving approximately 100,UOO people with a reference hospital and satellite health
centers. The health zones were given a considerable degree of autonomy, including responsibility
to develop cost recovery programs to meet their operating and maintenance costs (Bitran et al.,
1987). The management of one zone, Bwamanda, created an insurance program as a means of
generating revenue for its reference hospital aiid organizing the delivery of services in the zone. The
insurance plan is managed by the health zone and is thus a direct insurance program rather than a
third party arrangement, and it is administered as a prepaid capitation health care organization.
Enrollment in the plan is voluntary, but in an attempt to limit adverse selection, all members of a
family are required to join if one member joins. For residents of the zone who are not enrolled in
the plan, case-based fees are charged, with 16 case payment rates related to the diagnostic
characteristics of the patient. Insured persons who have been referred from a health center pay a
copayment equal to 20 percent of the case price charged to uninsured residents of the zone. In
addition, the hospital charges non-residents twice the resident rate and salaried employees persons
(whose employers are required by Zairian law to pay the full cost of their medical care) 250 percent
of this rate. In a sense, there are two insurance plans in the zone; one for the voluntary enrollees
(60 percent of the zone's population in 1989) and employer-paid coverage (4.6 percent). Unlike the
other insurance programs discussed above, the Bwamanda insurance plan only covers hospital services
(plus chronic care treatment in health centers). However, hospitalization benefits are only available
to members who can document that they were referred from a satellite health center.
The Bwamanda Health Plan and the requirement for employers to pay the health care costs of
salaried employees generate distinct financial incentives to providers and consumers for each of three
population groups: the insured, the uninsured, and the employer-paid group. The insured group has
paid its premium and thus wishes to maximize its utilization, though this is limited by its 20 percent
cost sharing and the requirement to pay for care at health centers. The hospital and the insurance
plan (the same organization) wish to minimize the use of services by this group, as it does not want
claims payments to exceed premium income (the prepaid capitation incentive). The uninsured try to
avoid use of the hospital because they face high prices if they are admitted. The hospital wants this
group to use the hospital, but hopes to minimize the level of inputs provided to any person admitted
so that treatment costs do not exceed the case payment rate (the retrospective case-based incentive).
The employer-paid group does not face any charges, so they will maximize their use of the hospital.
The hospital also has incentives to admit employees (but to still minimize resource inputs during their
stay), as employers pay at a much higher rate than that paid by other patients.
Cost escalation. The impact of the Bwamanda Health Plan on cost escalation cannot be
discussed in the same context as the impacts of the national insurance programs previously described.
6 Information on the Bwamanda health zone in Zaire is derived from Shepard et al., 1990.
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Data on the real level of the annual premium show that it has increased at an annual rate of 9.5
percent since 1986. This is not indicative of any problem; rather, the insurance program was
established in 1986 with the goal of increasing resources for the reference hospital of the zone.
Evidence from the first few years under the plan show that this goal has been reached. 100 percent
of hospital charges for plan beneficiaries were covered by premium income in 1987 and 1988, with
additional resources left over to cover administrative costs. Cost re(c3very in the hospital increased
from about 48 percent of operating costs in 1985 to 79 percent in 1988.
Resource allocation and referral. Even though the insurance plan does not cover charges
in health centers (except for care of chronic conditions), it includes strong incentives to discourage
self-referral to the hospital. Specifically, the plan will pay for hospital care only if a beneficiary has
a referral slip from a health center. Insured patients who self-refer to the hospital must pay the full
(non-covered) fee for a private physician visit. The incentive for first using less complex facilities
is thus built directly into its reimbursement rules. Another aspect of the plan which encourages
appropriate use of primary care facilities is what insured women are entitled to a free hospital delivery
only if they have received prenatal care. The health plan takes a very active role in managing the
use of facilities in the zone, a task simplified because the provider and insurer are the same entity,
thus making referral rules relatively easy to enforce.
Access and equity. The
incentives in place for the three Table 3. Distribution of Payment Categories in the
groups of the population are borne Bwamanda Health Zone Population and Hospital Patients,
out by hospital utilization data. The Dec. 1988 - Oct. 1989 (matemity patients excluded)
results of a sample of hospital _ ____ H i 
patients by payment category during Payment Population Hospital Ratio of
1988-1989 are presented in Table 3. Category t%) Patients Patients to
The table clearly shows that salaried l (%) Population
employees were heavily Employed 4.6 17.3 3.76
overrepresented (relative to their I
population share) in the hospital, and Insured 60.2 76.7 1.27
the insured plan members were also Not insured 35.2 6.1 0.17
overrepresented. The non-insured
were very much underrepresented. Source: Shepardetal., 1990
Based on the hospital register of
admissions by payment source, 1989
hospital admission rates were also
found to be lower among the uninsured than those insured through the plan (by nearly 700 percent),
and much lower (nearly twenty-fold) than those whose fees were paid by their employers. This
suggests a combination of limited access for the very poor (as there are apparently no exemptions
from payment), moral hazard arising from the financial protection provided by insurance and
employer payment, and the hospital's incentive to admit salaried employees to receive the highest
payment rate. The enrollment in the plan of individuals who believed they were likely to use the
hospital (adverse selection) was also probably a factor in the overrepresentation of plan members in
the hospital.
Lessons learned. The purpose of establishing a health insurance program in Bwamanda was
to increase the level of resources available for health services. Increases have been achieved, yet the
allocation of resources has been tightly managed and utilization of non-hospital services strongly
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encouraged by the program. The direct insurance model wherein the insurer and provider are the
same entity offers advantages over third party payment in terms of organizing the health care system
efficiently. For example, no specific referral incentives to providers are needed; therefore, referral
rules are more easiiy enforced. The principal drawback of the voluntary insurance approach used
in Bwamanda is differential access to care between the uninsured and the insured (including
employer-paid). The greater use of services by the insured reflects moral hazard arising from
insurance coverage, but may also mean that access for the uninsured is limited by their inability to
pay. The latter is of greater concern, but the magnitude of tlhis problem is unknown. Another issue
related to the Bwamanda Plan is that it has a monopoly on the provision of hospital services in the
region. This may limit the replicability of this model in other regions unless they have the resources
and the will to assure maintenance of the quality of service provision. Nevertheless, the success of
the Bwamanda Health Plan in organizing and sustaining the services provided in the health zone
demonstrate that insurance can be a viable option for financing health services in a rural area with
a population primarily composed of self-employed farmers.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The principal recommendation for the design of health insurance programs derived from these
case studies is that insurers should take a very active role in establishing institutional mechanisms
(such as contractual obligations) that encourage providers of health services to make efficient and
equitable resource allocation decisions. Incentives to providers are most important because they
determine the supply of services and also have tremendous leverage over demand, due to consumers'
dependence on providers for assistance in defining their personal health care needs. By controlling
supply and strongly influencing demand for services, providers can increase the use of curative care
services in a manner that, as the examples of Brazil, China, and Korea show, leads to rapid escalation
in health care costs, distortion of resource allocation in the sector, inappropriate use of medical
technologies, and inequitable access to the services available. To correct these distortions, a public
insurance institution should actively intervene by creating incentives to encourage providers to behave
in a manner consistent with social goals. This is most easily achieved with direct insurance because
the goals of the insurer and provider are identical, but it is possible for third party payers to take an
active role as well. The following paragraphs suggest additional conclusions and recommendations
derived from the case studies.
Cost Escalation
In each of these countries, alternative financing mechanisms were introduced as a means of
increasing the level of resources available in the health sector and/or reducing government subsidies.
Thus, it is not surprising that each has been associated with rapid growth in health and hospital
expenditures. Cost escalation is problematic where the incentives of a specific financing program
cause expenditures to spiral out of control. Lessons learned from these case studies suggest that a
fee-for-service pricing system coupled with third party reimbursement of private providers (or
providers who behave as if they were private, i.e., exhibit profit- or revenue-maximizing behavior,
as in China) for billed services leads to large and rapid increases in health care costs via provider
incentives to increase the volume and sometimes the average cost of services. Theory indicates that
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beneficiary cost-sharing should limit this tendency, but the presence of very high copayment
requirements in Korea apparently did little to mitigate cost escalation. (An income elastic demand for
health care services in Korea explains some but not all of their health cost increases since the late
1970s.) This suggests that providers have a very important impact on the quantity of services
ultimately demanded by health consumers (given the ignorance of most consumers of their medical
treatment needs and options), and that to achieve greater cost containment, incentives must discourage
providers from expanding the volume and cost of services beyond what is cost effective. To the
extent possible, insuring institutions acting in the public interest should create incentives so that the
fipancial interests of providers correspond with their ova.i. One possible model for this is the aspect
of the Brazilian iusurance system after 1983 that gives public primary care providers responsibility
for defining the course of a patient's treatment. This component of the program separates the
decision on the serv to be provided to a patient from the provider who will ultimately be
reimbursed for pros u;' the defined services.
Retrospective case-based reimbursement is presumed to result in less cost escalation than a fee-
for-service system, but evidence from Brazil to date is inadequate to support the presumption. Case-
based reimbursement does not eliminate the incentive to increase costs; the incentive is to maximize
profitable admissions and minimize the quantity of services provided per admission. This
arrangement is likely to somewhat limit cost increases but may have negative implications for the
quality of care and require either competition or regulation to maintain standards. Furthermore,
where a mix of private and public providers is financed on this basis, as in Brazil, private hospitals
have an incentive to alter their case mix toward less severe, more profitable patients, sending sicker
patients to the public hospitals. This can result in an overly strained public system.
Resource Allocation and Referral
Because third party fee-for-service reimbursement by a passive insurer generates rapidly rising
curative health care costs, it tends to lead to a decline in the relative share of health resources devoted
to preventive services. This does not necessarily imply a decline in resource availability for
prevention, but for most countries, the marginal benefit of additional resources in preventive services
would be greater than in curative services. This impact can be mitigated if the provision of
preventive services can be subsidized out of the revenues generated by the expansion of curative care.
Such cross-subsidization is most feasible when there is a unitary authority responisible for all levels
of health care, from primary prevention to hospital services. Two models for this are the direct
insurance approach used in Bwamanda, where the health zone is responsible for all levels of care but
generates revenues through the provision of curative care, and the SUDS in Brazil, which unifies the
resources and administration of curative and preventive services. Both approaches should be closely
monitored to determine how effectively they allocate resources.
Financing systems can generate incentives for the use of specific types of facilities via price
incentives to consumers or by fiat. Evidence from Korea suggests that price incentives may not work
very well if perceived quality differences between levels of facilities is great. Making reimbursement
contingent upon a patient's use of specified points of entry into the provider network appears to be
more effective. In Bwamanda, this functions as a price incentive, with a very large penalty tor
insured persons who self-refer to the hospital. The post-1983 Brazilian plan to require entry to the
health system via a public primary care provider also creates a structured pattern of referral and
generates provider incentives similar to that of the direct insurance model (since the provider is
employed by the insurer).
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Medical Technology Incentives
Incentives that influence the use of a medical technology arise from how these specific services
are priced, as is evident from the experience of Brazil and China. Providers have an incentive to
maximize utilizatiun of those services for which the margin of reimbursement over costs of provision
is greatest, and consumers both rely on the medical judgment of providers and often tend to equate
new high-technology procedures and a greater quantity of pharmaceuticals with better health care.
When the price or reimbursement rate differ from the marginal cost of the service, the incentive may
distort the provision of services away from what is socially optimal and medically appropriate by
introducing personal or institutional financial considerations into the choice of technology decision.
The long term efficiency consequences of this distortion can be severe, as investment in future
capacity is often based on current utilization. The problems can be mitigated to some extent by using
case-based rather than retrospective reimbursement, but overprovision incentives may remain,
depending on the nature of the case payment categories. Insurers should strive to remove either price
distortions through improved understanding of the marginal costs of provision or be conscious of the
incentives they would like to create regarding the acquisition and use of specific medical technologies,
including pharmaceuticals.
Access and Equity
Insurance coverage is a means of access to medical services which might otherwise be difficult
for many persons if prices for services, especially those provided in hospitals, were high enough to
recover costs. When coverage is universal, as is practically the case in Brazil and has recently
become true for Korea, differences in access arising from insurance status should not occur, although
the poor appear to suffer a degree of limited access due to a relative lack of providers in poor rural
areas, and, in Korea, a heavier burden of formal and informal cost-sharing obligations. However,
when only part of the population has such coverage, as in China and Zaire's Bwamanda health zone,
disparities are likely, as the cost of using health services facing the uninsured as compared to the
insured population is radically different. Partial insurance typically exacerbates equity problems
because the insured also tend to have higher incomes than the uninsured. The disparity in utilization
of services does not necessarily imply that access for the uninsured is inadequate, but access for the
most vulnerable groups should be examined in detail and measures should be taken, such as
exemptions from payment or public assistance for the purchase of insurance (as in Korea), to
guarantee a minimum standard of access to care for all citizens.
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